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In the April 2003 issue of Atlantic Monthly, Robert Kaplan describes Eritrea as “newly independent, 
sleepily calm and remarkably stable”. Electricity is said to fail infrequently, corruption is rare, theft and 
crime almost unheard of, reflecting, Kaplan claims, “a surprisingly functional social order”  Eritrea is 
said to have “achieved a degree of non-coercive social discipline” by implication, unusual for Africa.  The 
country’s political culture is described as “an almost Maoist degree of mobilization and an almost 
Albanian degree of xenophobia.” In this account, Eritrea is an exotic specimen, not quite African, atypical 
in almost all respects.  
But is Eritrea accurately reflected or understood in this account?  Is Eritrea really as isolated and 
marginal as this suggests?  Is its development agenda and state-building project that divergent from 
elsewhere? Kaplan hints that Eritrea’s sense of nationhood — “rare in a world of nation-states rent by 
tribalism and globalisation”  — exists despite globalisation. But this is in complete contrast to current 
research which emphasizes that “transnationalism does not necessarily operate in opposition to 
nationalism but can at times work to reinforce it”.  In contrast, Kaplan’s article takes as read the official 
account of Eritrean nationalism, emphasizing that it is a product not simply of its history, but also of its 
having been isolated and alienated from international and regional influences: “we Eritreans are different 
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In the April 2003 issue of Atlantic Monthly, Robert Kaplan describes Eritrea as “newly 
independent, sleepily calm and remarkably stable”.2 Electricity is said to fail infrequently, 
corruption is rare, theft and crime almost unheard of, reflecting, Kaplan claims, “a 
surprisingly functional social order”.3  Eritrea is said to have “achieved a degree of non-
coercive social discipline” by implication, unusual for Africa.4  The country’s political 
culture is described as “an almost Maoist degree of mobilization and an almost Albanian 
degree of xenophobia.”5 In this account, Eritrea is an exotic specimen, not quite African, 
atypical in almost all respects. 
But is Eritrea accurately reflected or understood in this account?  Is Eritrea really 
as isolated and marginal as this suggests?  Is its development agenda and state-building 
project that divergent from elsewhere? Kaplan hints that Eritrea’s sense of nationhood — 
“rare in a world of nation-states rent by tribalism and globalisation”  — exists despite 
globalisation. But this is in complete contrast to current research which emphasizes that 
“transnationalism does not necessarily operate in opposition to nationalism but can at 
times work to reinforce it”.6  In contrast, Kaplan’s article takes as read the official 
account of Eritrean nationalism, emphasizing that it is a product not simply of its history, 
but also of its having been isolated and alienated from international and regional 
influences: “we Eritreans are different from our neighbours”.7  
Kaplan’s article conforms to many standard accounts of the Eritrean struggle for 
liberation and experience of statehood.8  But despite its orthodoxy and pervasiveness, it is 
increasingly contested, by events on the ground, and research.  Whereas in Zimbabwean 
historiography, it was the ‘peasant question’ that forced the re-evaluation of the 
nationalist legacy, in Eritrea, research on land, as well as gender issues, the diaspora, and 
globalisation are beginning to generate important counter-narratives. The paper seeks to 
                                                  
2 Robert Kaplan, “A Tale Of Two Colonies”  Atlantic Monthly April 2003., pp 46-53. 
http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2003/04/kaplan.htm. 
3 Kaplan, “Tale Of Two Colonies” page 52 
4 Kaplan, “Tale Of Two Colonies” page 51.  
5 Kaplan, “Tale Of Two Colonies” page 52 
6 Victoria Bernal, “Eritrea and the global village: reflections on nationalism in a transnational era” 
unpublished paper, 1. Similar points are made in Soren Walther Nielsen, “Reintegration of ex-Fighters in 
Highland Eritrea: a window into the process of State formation and its lines of Social Stratification” 
Unpublished PhD thesis, Roskilde University, Denmark, October 2002 see especially chapter 5; John 
Sorenson and Atsuko Matsuoka, “Phantom Wars and Cyberwars: Abyssinian Fundamentalism and 
Catastrophe in Eritrea”  Dialectical Anthropology 26 (2001), 37-63; Nadje Al-Ali, Richard Black and 
Khalid Koser,  “Refugees and transnationalism: the experience of Bosnians and Eritreans in Europe” 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Sxtudies 27, 4 (2001), 615-634;   Nadje Al-Ali, Richard Black and Khalid 
Koser, “The limits to ‘transnationalism: Bosnian and Eritrean refugees in Europe as emerging transnational 
communities” Ethnic and Racial Studies 24, 4 (2001), 578-600.  
7 Kaplan, “Tale Of Two Colonies” 52 
8 Kaplan is, of course, by no means the only journalist writing in this mode, although he is probably the 
most prominent.  Before the 1998 war, glowing tributes to Eritrea were very much the norm, and were 
frequently reprinted in the Eritrean official press.  See for other examples:  Peter Worthington, “Menace Of 
Foreign Aid” Toronto Sun, 28 December 1998, which describes Eritrea as “the most unusual [country] in 
Africa, if not the world”;  or Robert Weissman, “An African Star?  Free Eritrea Faces the Challenges 
Ahead” Multinational Monitor July/August 1996.   A more in-depth, but similarly panegyric account is to 
be found in: Dan Connell, “Eritrea: Starting from Scratch” ROAPE 66 (1995), pp. 587-592.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS105  Page 3 
investigate both the discursive power of conventional narratives and the implications of 
this new research for accounts of state and nation-building in Eritrea.  
 
Liberation and letting go  
The conventional account of Eritrean nationalism is grounded in Eritrea’s 30-year 
struggle for independence, which in 1991 culminated in de facto independence when 
EPLF troops took control of the capital Asmara.  Recognized at this point by most of the 
international community, the  1993 UN-supervised referendum merely codified and 
legitimised the sovereignty of the territory.9  The Eritrean liberation fighters were rightly 
celebrated for their innovativeness and resilience.  Contemporaneous accounts emphasize 
the liberation movement’s commitment to gender equality and to eliminating harmful 
traditional practices such as FGM.  Fighters constructed positive relations with local 
populations, bringing them medicine and education, and sharing their meagre rations with 
them rather than extracting resources from the impoverished communities.10 Who has not 
been impressed with the numerous accounts and pictures of Eritrean hospitals and 
schools hidden under ground and under trees, yet clearly meeting the needs of the injured 
and pupils?11 
  These exertions were necessary because few recognized the Eritrean right to self-
determination.  Colonized by the Italians in the late 1800s, Eritrea was never properly 
decolonised.  The end of World War Two resulted in its being granted to Britain as a 
‘mandate territory’ until 1952. In 1952 Eritrea was federated into Ethiopia as an 
autonomous region, a situation that soon deteriorated, as Ethiopia forcefully integrated 
Eritrea into its state. The flawed decision to pursue federation reflected divisions within 
Eritrea, and divisions among the great powers, all of whom had their own interests at 
heart.12    Organised armed resistance to federation, first took form in the Eritrean 
Liberation Front (ELF)  which was founded in Cairo in 1960.  The ELF drew its original 
supporters from the Muslim community in Eritrea, and received support mainly from 
Arab and Muslim states.  Conflicts within the ELF drove out reformers, who formed the 
Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) in the early 1970s.13  The EPLF then dedicated 
itself to creating a secular, unified liberation movement with the ability to win the support 
of the masses and drive the Ethiopians out of Eritrea permanently.  
                                                  
9 For an interesting discussion of why Eritrea was recognized as sovereign but not Somaliland, see: Hussein 
Adam, “Formation and recognition of new states: Somaliland in contrast to Eritrea” ROAPE 59, (1994) 21-
38.   
10 See for instance,  Dan Connell, Against All Odds(New Jersey: Red Sea, 1993) Chapter 4 “Hearts and 
Minds” or Richard Leonard, “Popular participation in Liberation and Revolution” in Lionel Cliffe and Basil 
Davidson eds, The Long Struggle of Eritrea (UK: Spokesman, 1988). 
11 For classic images of the struggle see James Firebrace with Stuart Holland, Never Kneel Down (New 
Jersey: Red Sea, 1985); Glenys Kinnock, Eritrea : images of war and peace (London: Chatto & Windus, 
1988) or Dan Connell, Against All Odds(New Jersey: Red Sea, 1993). 
12 See for an excellent account: Ruth Iyob,  The Eritrean Struggle for Independence (Cambridge: CUP, 
1995).  
13 The best account of this period remains John Markakis, National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1987) Chapter 5 “The Eritrean Revolution” and/or John Markakis, “The Nationalist 
Revolution in Eritrea” JMAS 26, 1 (1988), 51-70.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS105  Page 4 
It is difficult to capture how deeply the ethos of the liberation struggle and the 
EPLF appears to have penetrated Eritrean society – the streets of Asmara are marked by 
the struggle, not just in renamed streets and official art and sculpture, but also the names 
of shops and businesses.  Similarly, children born during the struggle were given names 
like ‘Harnet’ (Liberation/Freedom). The multiplicity of challenges to Eritrea’s 
nationhood – from the UN, the OAU, neighbouring states, and world powers – meant that 
the Eritrean struggle for self-determination has a particular potency. It is constitutive of 
Eritrean identity and citizenship, as well as of nationhood.  As one scholar of liberation 
narratives put it, we must study “how the Eritreans made the revolution and how the 
revolution made them in turn”14 
Liberation and self-determination were not simply goals achieved with the EPLF’s 
victory in 1991; they continue to structure political discourse, debate and national 
policies. Two recent theses, on the self-perceptions of Eritreans, reflect widespread 
opinion about Eritrean identity and values. Hoyle’s thesis investigated the national 
identity “promoted by the EPLF in motivating young [people] to exchange their lives for 
an Eritrean nation”.15 Based on interviews and surveys at the University of Asmara, 
Hoyle identified what she calls component values of Eritrean national identity: ethical 
behaviour, belief in critical public speech, perseverance or steadfastness, an emphasis on 
the community over the individual, and a commitment to self-reliance.16  Ofuho’s thesis, 
based on interviews with elite and ex-fighter Eritreans, as well as students at the 
University of Asmara, proposed that: 
Unlike Ethiopians who viewed liberation more as a means for democratising 
states structures, Eritreans viewed liberation as a way of life, a road to self-
determination and i ndependence….Liberation for the Eritrean becomes a 
civic virtue through a common war experience…the actual struggle is not 
viewed as a way towards liberation, but as ‘liberation or emancipation’ 
itself.17 
The post-liberation state is not simply marked by the ‘heritage’ of the war, but continues 
to be actively shaped by the imperatives of the struggle. As Martin Doornbos has stated 
“the continued importance of the liberation struggle…to the composition and orientation 
of Eritrea’s political leadership can hardly be overestimated”.18   
 
                                                  
14 Cirino Hiteng Ofuho, “Discourses On Liberation And Democracy”. Upublished PhD thesis, University of 
Kent  (1997), page 90.  
15 Peggy Ann Hoyle, “Eritrean National Identity: a case study” in North Carolina Journal of international 
Law and Commercial regulation 24, 2 (1999), 401; the portions of the article which I cite derive directly 
from her thesis: Peggy Ann Hoyle, “Eritrean national identity: the role of education and the constitution” 
(PhD thesis, UNC, 1997).  
16 Hoyle, “Eritrean National Identity” pp. 401-5.  
17 Ofuho, “Discourses On Liberation And Democracy”, page 271; See also his article “Discourses on 
Liberation and Democracy – Eritrean Self-views” The Electronic Review of World Politics 1, 1 (2000).  
18 Martin Doornbos, “The war torn societies project in Eritrea: an introduction” in Martin Doornbos and 
Alemseged Tesfai eds. Post Conflict Eritrea: prospects for Reconstruction and development (New Jersey: 
Red Sea Press, 1999), page 9.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS105  Page 5 
Politics of Research in Eritrea 
Foreign journalists and academics have played almost as important a role in narrating, 
documenting, and advancing the nationalist agenda as the Eritrean fighters themselves.19 
It is also striking how many of the key intellectuals dedicated to advancing the Eritrean 
nationalist struggle had been involved in similar projects elsewhere on the continent.  In 
many ways, the Eritrean struggle avoided many of the pitfalls of earlier, yet flawed, 
revolutions and seemed markedly progressive. Thus in Eritrea, we find a nationalist 
history  par excellence, with all that school’s weaknesses and strengths.20 Most 
importantly, this history challenged Ethiopian myths of regional dominance, which had 
proven remarkably  potent on the world stage.21  This research was thus an important 
component in establishing Eritrea’s right to sovereignty.  
More problematically, since independence, research has continued to be tightly 
controlled in the service of  the ‘national interest’.22  For example, the War-torn Societies 
Project was an attempt to extend participant-action research from the micro- to the 
macro- level in societies rebuilding after war.  In Eritrea, the local researchers chosen 
were almost all senior government officials.  In Doornbos’ words, this ‘had the effect, if 
not the intention, that no independent researchers would be making enquiries into policy 
areas that might possibly be considered sensitive’.23  More generally, the research project 
‘became closely tied with the government’.  24  The Eritreans are described as having 
averted the danger of “diluting control over the policy process” by “effectively 
‘nationalizing’ the core research establishment”.25  Now, in terms of the government’s 
objectives, this is clearly a positive outcome. But for our current concerns, it also 
contributed to a particular kind of research “less devoted to weighing the pros and cons of 
a specific policy issue” and providing instead “a broad baseline survey of the main issues 
and challenges”.26   
Perhaps in 1995, when the project began, the lack of data on Eritrea was the most 
significant challenge to policy-making. But questions must also be asked about the data 
used.  As one sympathetic reviewer commented, “there is little talk about or assessment 
of the views and needs of the various local communities…and how exactly these 
communities were ‘in dialogue’ with the project”.27 Yet this book, published in 1999, 
remains the only major engagement with development issues in Eritrea since the 1993 
                                                  
19 Dan Connell, Against All Odds(New Jersey: Red Sea, 1993); Lionel Cliffe and Basil Davidson eds, The 
Long Struggle of Eritrea (UK: Spokesman, 1998); John Sorenson, “Discourses on Eritrean Nationalism and 
Identity” JMAS 29, 2 (1991), pp 310-317; Roy Pateman, “Liberte, Egalite Fraternite: Aspects of the 
Eritrean Revolution” JMAS 28, 3 (1990), pp. 457-472.  
20 See Bill Freund, “Africanist History and the History of Africa’ Chapter 1 of  The Making of 
Contemporary History  (Macmillan, 1998) for an important assessment of African historiography.  
21 Ruth Iyob, The Eritrean Struggle for Independence (Cambridge: CUP, 1995), esp. Chapters 2 and 3. 
22 See for instance, Nielsen’s account of attempting to gain research clearance (Nielsen, “Reintegration of 
ex -Fighters in Highland Eritrea” (Annex: Research methodologies), also, consider the theme of the 
University of Asmara’s first international research symposium: ‘The Role Of Research In Nation-Building’ 
(June 2002).  
23 Doornbos, “The War-torn Societies Project” page 16.  
24 Doornbos, “The War-torn Societies Project”  page 25. 
25 Doornbos, “The War-torn Societies Project”  pp 25-6.  
26 Doonrbos, “The War-torn Societies Project” page 20.  
27 Jon Abbink, Review of Doornbos and Tesfai, Post Conflict Eritrea JMAS 38, 3 (Sept 2000), 525.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS105  Page 6 
publication Emergent Eritrea.28  As the sub-titles of these two books tell us, they are 
interested in the ‘challenges’ of and ‘prospects’ for development.  Yet, as academics we 
are called upon to analyse existing policies, examine their impacts on communities, and 
establish their strengths and weaknesses.29 
  The War-torn Societies Project also illustrates another dilemma of contemporary 
scholarship: how to distinguish between peoples, governments, and states.   Doornbos 
identified the high level involvement of government officials as an issue of ‘national 
ownership’. The problem here seems to be, however, that the ‘nation’ (and also the state) 
is defined as the government.  This analytic confusion is significant, because it lies at the 
heart of the current government’s definition and role in Eritrea: the identity of the 
nationalist movement and its political manifestation, the People’s Front for Democracy 
and Justice (PFDJ), are near indistinguishable from that of the state.  
 
Reassessing Liberation, little by little 
Despite efforts to control research, some incremental steps towards reassessing liberation 
and the post-liberation state have been taken, mostly by anthropologists, much of it 
unpublished. Current political unrest in Eritrea has also resulted in re-assessments of the 
history of the liberation war, mostly on the web.30 In the following sections, I want to 
review some of this new material, and see how it contributes to reassessing Eritrea’s pre- 
and post-independence politics.31   
   Some interpret the post-liberation policies of the EPLF/PFDJ as an enviable 
continuity of their pre-independence politics: self-reliance, solidarity, and unity. 32 But 
these accounts fail to explain how and why the Eritrean polity could also come to be 
accused of human rights abuses, how senior members of the struggle remain in jail, why 
revered spokespeople fear to speak their minds, why undergraduate students at the 
University of Asmara resist undertaking research topics on Eritrean politics.33  
                                                  
28 Gebre Hiwot Tesfagiorgis ed., Emergent Eritrea: Challenges of Economic Development (New Jersey: 
Red Sea, 1993).  
29 A model here might be the approach taken by Wendy James  et al, who compile insightful 
anthropological research on both the pre-1991 and post 1991 periods in  Ethiopia: Wendy James, Donald 
Donham, Eisei Kurimoto and Alessandro Triulzi eds. Remapping Ethiopia, socialism and after (Oxford: 
James Currey, 2002) 
30 See for instance: Saleh Gadi, “Kebire, the Father of Martyrs” messelna.com; Taher Indoul, “In memory 
of Awate, the history maker” 1 September 2001, awate.com; “Live From Syria: a trip down memory lane: a 
glimpse into Eritrean History”  awate.com 2 February 2003; “ELF military Activities 1968-1969” 
awate.com 12 February 2003.  
31 In practice, the text of this paper emphasizes the post-liberation politics.  Incremental points made about 
the liberation struggle include Kjetil Tronvoll’s account of forced conscription to the EPLF, and Soren 
Nielsen’s accounts of sexual harassment of women fighters.  Kjetil Tronvoll, Mai Weini (New Jersey: Red 
Sea, 1998) pp.57-8, 174-75  and Nielsen, “Reintegration of Ex-fighters” pp. 168-174.  
32 See for instance, Dan Connell, “The importance of self-reliance: NGOs and Democracy-building in 
Eritrea” ( Middle East Report, Spring 2000) pages 28-32;  Dan Connell, “New Challenges in Post-War 
Eritrea” Eritrean Studies Review 1, 2 (1997), pages 129-159; Dan Connell,  Rethinking Revolution: New 
Strategies for Democracy and Social Justice  (New Jersey, Red Sea Press, 2002) . 
33 For a concise account of Eritrea’s political crisis, see Martin Plaut, “The Birth of the Eritrean Reform 
Movement” ROAPE 91 (2002), pp.119-124. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS105  Page 7 
  Instead, emerging narratives challenge us to question the impact of the liberation 
war, and the nature of the state.  The Eritrean post-liberation state is widely recognized to 
be strong, controlling and mobilized34, but the reasons for this are complex. The 
influences which have created such a  phenomenon  – when it is often argued that 
globalisation is weakening the nation-state – are manifold. Although most authors would 
credit the learning curve of the long struggle, other influences, including continuities with 
previous regimes and the modernist paradigm are also important.   
For instance, Matsuoka and Sorenson argue that processes of top-down 
administration and control are part of a dialectic in Eritrean liberation politics:  
Over the course of the history of the Eritrean nationalist movement two 
contradictory tendencies have opposed one another…an egalitarian tendency 
has encouraged self-reliance…opposing this is a tendency to control 
everything.  This tendency is rooted in some authoritarian aspects of 
traditional culture and in the exigencies of a prolonged and desperate war.35 
 
Others emphasize the impact of 30 years of conflict on the leadership: 
..the sheer brutality of the war and the massive social dislocation it 
occasioned was understood as necessitating a movement that had to be 
exceptionally disciplined while also intimately attuned to the sympathies of 
the people.  Nationalism therefore became impregnated by the model of war, 
whose own specific culture and terminology it tended to assimilate into the 
ordinary language of nationalist militancy.36  
 
Or, as Nielsen puts it less emotively, the “ethos of fighting…produced the legitimacy and 
sovereignty of the Eritrean post-war state.”37  But Nielsen himself would question 
accounts of monolithic states and societies.  If anthropological and micro-level political 
research reveals nothing else, it surely shows how varied experiences of war – and post 
war – can be for populations. And as Rock et al argued as early as 1996, earlier divisions 
may still persist, despite the unifying impact of the struggle:  
The country’s long war for self-determination may in fact have been 
characterised not by the integration and mutual fuelling of different levels and 
types of conflict but more by the subsuming of all other differences that had 
potential for conflict to the one ‘national’ struggle against Ethiopian overrule; 
                                                  
34 For a discussion of mobilizing and demobilizing tendencies in post-liberation states see  Sara R ich 
Dorman, “From the Politics of Inclusion to the Politics of Exclusion: NGOs and the Constitutional Debate 
in Zimbabwe” JSAS (forthcoming). 
35 Atsuko Matsuoka and John Sorenson, “After independence: prospects for Women in Eritrea” 
unpublished paper, n.d.  
36 Ofuho, “Discourses on Liberation and Democracy: Eritrean self-views”. n.p.; emphasis added.  
37 Nielsen, “Re-integration of Ex-fighters” 11.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS105  Page 8 
other possible conflicts may have been obscured or put on hold during the 
liberation war.38 
 
Rock et al are referring mainly to resource conflicts, but Victoria Bernal makes exactly 
the same point regarding gender issues: “…some profound issues of gender relations in 
society were not so much transformed by EPLF’s cultural revolution as repressed and 
rendered invisible.”39 Tekle Woldemikael also warns of the potential politicisation  of 
cultural and religious cleavages in independent Eritrea.40  These arguments suggest that 
we need to move beyond a simplistic emphasis on the liberation war in order to identify 
the influences on the Eritrean state-building project.  
One approach has been to identify continuities with previous regimes. Christopher 
Clapham controversially suggests that “Eritrean nationalism…appears to reproduce, 
within the colonial boundaries of Eritrea, a concept of boundary and territory almost 
indistinguishable from that of both imperial and revolutionary governments in the years 
before 1991 in Ethiopia as a whole.”41   Many policies – unitary administration, ethnicity, 
suspicion of ‘new churches’ and the mobilization of youth  – do seem to reflect the 
politics of Ethiopia when the current generation of leaders were students. But these 
policies also reflect the modernizing aims of the Eritrean leadership.  As we will see 
below, this framework of modernism helps us understand not only attitudes towards 
secularism, identity, and administration but also to issues of land use, and development 
approaches.42  
 
Citizenship & Governance 
Post-liberation politics has been marked by a series of self-consciously ‘nation-building’ 
policies.  These have attempted to mould a national identity out of the multi-ethnic and 
religiously plural population.   
A major policy initiative was the reorganization of administrative units created for 
purposes of ‘divide and rule’ under previous administrations.  The 6 new regions overlap 
and integrate previous, ethnically  defined, regions.43 Eritrean nationalist discourse 
emphasizes that because of such efforts, national identity has become more important 
than ethnicity for Eritreans. Data collected by Eric Garcetti in 1997 backed up this 
                                                  
38 June Rock, Lionel Cliffe and Philip White, “The potential for Conflicts over environmental Resources in 
Eritrea and the Types of mechanisms or Initiatives that need to be in place for conflict management” Paper 
prepared for the conference on the Environment, Asmara, 12-16 February 1996. emphasis added.   
39 Bernal, “From Warriors to Wives” page 9; see also Victoria Bernal, “Equality to Die for? Women 
Guerilla Fighters and Eritrea’s Cultural Revolution” Political and Legal Anthropology Review  23 , 2 
(2000), 61-76.  
40 Tekle Woldemikael, “The Cultural Construction of Eritrean Nationalist Movements” in Crawford Young 
ed. The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism (Madison: university of Wisconsin, 1993), pp 179-199.  
41 Christopher Clapham, “Boundary and territory in the Horn of Africa”  in Paul Nugent and A.I.. Asiwaju 
eds, African Boundaries” Barriers, Conduits, and Opportunities London: Pinter, 1996), 242. 
42 James Scott, Seeing like a state (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); See also,  Donald Donham, 
Marxist Modern (Oxford: James Currey, 1999). 
43 “Eritrea to have 6 administrative regions” Eritrea Profile, 20 May 1995, page 1; see also Tesfai, “Issues 
of Governance” pp 274-279.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS105  Page 9 
claim.44  At the same time, both the  EPLF and the PFDJ have promoted the cultural 
aspects of ethnic groups – their languages, dances, and music.45 Despite this, Tronvoll 
has argued that efforts to “bypass and thus neutralize, the traditional organising principles 
of ethnicity and descent” must not “push too hard, too fast, to neutralize the identities 
below the level of the state, since this may very well back-fire on the process of 
achieving national unity, and creating and sustaining a national Eritrean identity.”46  
Language policy designed to serve “national identity, unity and interest”   47 has 
also proved controversial. Rather than advancing one or more national languages, a 
policy developed during the struggles advocates the equality of all Eritrean languages. As 
the PFDJ official Zemheret Yohannes puts it:  
The Eritrean experiment is an attempt to strike a viable and judicious balance 
between the fundamental rights of language groups for cultural and linguistic 
self-affirmation, on the one hand, and the demands of living within a nation-
state in an increasing globalizing world on the other.48 
 
Under the national language policy, students are guaranteed instruction in their mother 
tongue in their first five years of education.   Yet Naty notes that the elites of some 
Muslim groups see the promotion of multiple small, previously unwritten languages as a 
way of advancing Tigrinya, over Arabic (which is not the mother tongue of most Muslim 
Eritreans).49  Chefena Hailemariam’s recently concluded doctoral research similarly 
identifies dissatisfaction  with the official policy among certain population groups.50 
Arabic-speaking journalists have also complained of marginalization. 51 
Eritrean nationalism and identity has also been actively inculcated in expatriate 
populations.  Several recent pieces of research on the diaspora emphasize the Eritrean 
government’s success in institutionalising a trans-national Eritrean identity, such that 
nationalism and trans-nationalism cannot be seen as opposing forces.  Victoria Bernal 
emphasizes the ways in which the liberation struggle itself was transnational.52  Since 
independence, this emphasis has been maintained.  Festivals and meetings of expatriate 
                                                  
44  Eric Garcetti, “”civic and ethnic Allegiances: Competing Visions of Nationalist Discourse in the Horn of 
Africa” paper presented to the International Studies Association 16-20 February 1999; See also  Eric 
Garcetti and Janet Gruber, “The Post-war nation: Rethinking the Triple Transition in Eritrea” in M Pugh 
ed., The Regeneration of War-torn societies (London: Macmillan, 1999)   
45 See Abbebe Kifleyesus’ interesting paper “Folk-Fairs and festivals as Cultural Conservation: featuring 
festival Ertra” paper presented to the Cultural Assets Rehabilitation Project Workshop: Culture in 
Sustainable Development, May 2002. 
46 Kjetil Tronvoll, “The process of nation-building in post-war Eritrea” JMAS 36, 3 (1998),  464-5 
47 “Unity in linguistic diversity” Interview with Abdella Jaber, Eritrea Profile, 27 July 1996, page 2.  
48 Zemhret Yohannes, “Homecoming: a return to our Languages” paper presented at the Intrenational 
Conference: Against All Odds: African Languages and Literatures into the 21
st century. 11-17 January 
2000.  
49 Alex Naty, “Potential conflicts in the former Gash-setit region, western Eritrea”.  Unpublished paper 
presented at the OSSREA conference, Khartoum, Sudan, 2002, page 2.  
50 Chefena Hailemariam, Language and Education in Eritrea: a case study of language diversity, policy 
and practice (Amsterdam: Aksant Academic Publishers, 2002).  
51 “No  room for Arabic in Eritrea?” Gedab investigative report. Awate.com 6 March 2002. 
52 Bernal, “Eritrea and the Global Village” 6-9.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS105  Page 10 
communities are attended by Ministers and PFDJ officials, who contribute to link 
expatriates to the state, as well as the nation. The Eritrean diaspora has been granted 
Eritrean citizenship, and are eligible to vote in referenda and elections.  These expatriate 
communities, which contributed voluntarily to support the liberation struggle, have also 
been taxed 2% of their income.  Al-ali et al note that support for this taxation was not 
party-specific: most expatriate Eritreans – even those affiliated to the ELF – were still 
willing to pay “on the understanding that these payments were being used to rebuild 
Eritrea”. 53 A more cynical account, relayed to me by an expatriate, makes the point that if 
you do not pay the tax, “nothing will get done for you”.  
Nation-building policies have also targeted the generation that has come of age 
since 1991, by implementing youth service programmes. National service for all was 
introduced in 1994 and written into the 1997 constitution.  It was designed to create a 
trained reserve army, connect young people to the older, liberation-war generation, and to 
develop cross-cultural understanding by  integrating the different ethnic groups and 
religions.54 The programme involved all ‘youth’ between the ages of 18 and 40 
undergoing 6 months military training  and 12 months of work in various ministries. In 
the same summer, the student work programme was  initiated, which saw secondary 
school students providing agricultural and environmental services under the supervision 
of the Ministry of Education. 55 In an interview, President Isaias emphasized, “Everybody 
recruited for national service has to go.  As for those who create lame excuses for not 
going, let them know that there is no way one can evade it.”56   
Groups which refused to participate in these programmes have been denied the 
right to citizenship.  The first group to resist national service was the small community of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses.  This led the government to claim that they had “relinquished’ their 
rights to citizenship by categorically and repeatedly refusing to recognize the state of 
Eritrea and its laws”.57 According to Human Rights Watch, four Jehovah’s Witnesses 
who resisted conscription have been jailed for more than 5 years.58   
Since the Eritrean-Ethiopian war of 1998-2000, many other young people have 
attempted to avoid conscription, at least in part because the original 18 months service 
has been extended indefinitely – most of those mobilized in May 1998 are still serving 
(either in the army or at civilian jobs) at a pecuniary wage.59  As a result, increasing 
numbers of students and conscripts have attempted to evade the state’s strict control of 
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population movement, by hiding, fleeing to Ethiopia, Yemen and the  Sudan, or forging 
exit visas.60  Crackdowns on those evading service have included the arrest of mothers 
and brothers  – in some cases these have been senior members of the liberation 
movement.61  
Local government is another area which reveals a top-down approach to citizens.  
In direct contrast to Ethiopia (and Uganda, the other functioning ‘movement’ system), 
Eritrea’s post 1991 governance emphasized unitary structures.  Eritrea has been lauded 
for the progressively making administrators and councillors equal. But the Baitos – 
people’s assemblies – have not been able to function as expected. As Asmerom Zerie 
argued in his study of Zoba Maakel Baito, despite the importance of Baitos as 
deliberative structures, they have no financial autonomy, being dependent on the regional 
administration for all resources.62  His research revealed that this lack of resources 
weakens the Baito’s accountability, and prevents it from meeting its obligations to 
residents and voters.63  An  obvious concomitant effect of this has been the lowering of 
respect among residents for the Baito members and institutions.  Whereas Baitos and 
regional administrators are sometimes described as being (de jure) at the same level of 
authority,64 they are subordinate (de facto) to the appointed administrators. Further 
increasing the power of appointed officials in mid- 2002, there were widespread reports 
that all regional administrators had been replaced with military generals.65  Local 
elections which began in 2002, seem unlikely to increase bottom-up power.  Government 
news sources report that in almost all villages, previously appointed administrators and 
deputies have been elected.66   
Despite the recent local-level elections, the legislative and judicial branches of 
government have remained under-developed in Eritrea.  Alemseged Tesfai seems to 
predict this outcome in his useful assessment of EPLF administration during the 
liberation war.  As he notes,  
The Central Committee a nd the Politburo…combined executive and 
legislative powers.  The judicial…was virtually non-existent…at the time of 
Independence  all the elements of a strong executive branch were present. Not 
so with the other two branches.67 
                                                  
60 See for instance, “39 members of Eritrean navy flee to Yemen” Walta Information Centre [Ethiopia], 2 
October 2002; “Eritrean deserters in enemy land”  IRIN 22 November 2002; “Government Calls up 
Graduates for national Service” IRIN 13 November 2002; “Nearly Forty dissident University Students 
arrested” Awate.com 13 May 2002; “Twelve Killed in Roundup (“Gffa”) Clashes” awate.com July 17, 
2002; “ Intense Nighttime Roundups—“Gffa”—In Eritrea”  awate.com  July 9, 2002; Alex Last “Eritrea 
sweeps capital for draft dodgers” Reuters, 19 April 1999.  
61 Amnesty International, “Arbitrary detention of government critics and journalists” 18 September 2002,  
page 13.  
62 Asmerom Zerie, “The role of baito in the development process: a case study of Zoba Maakel” Senior 
research paper, Dept of political science, University of Asmara, June 2002, 31.  
63 Zerie, page 31.  
64 Alemseged Tesfai, “Issues of Governance in the Eritrean Context” in Doornbos and Tesfai, Post-Conflict 
Eritrea page 265.  
65 See for instance, “The Freezing of General Sebhat Ephrem” Gedab news awate.com 13 October 2002; 
“Mr Naizghi Kiflu: out from intensive care unit; back to threats” Gedab news Awate.com, 9 January 2003.  
66 Yohannes Keleta “Local elections in sub zoba Hagaz” Shaebia news, 3 January 2003.  
67 Tesfai, “Issues of Governance” pp. 261-2.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS105  Page 12 
 
This situation continued during the post-independence years, despite efforts to train 
judges and build new institutions.  Epitomized by the failure to implement the 
Constitution – itself the result of a markedly participatory process – the weakness of both 
judiciary and legislature e rupted into crisis in 2001.  The reform movement which 
emerged in 2000 and 2001, criticized the failure to implement the ratified constitution, 
and called for much-delayed meetings of both the party deliberative structures, and the 
national legislature.68  The subsequent detentions of journalists, students, and prominent 
members of the liberation struggle (including former generals and cabinet ministers), 




Development policy has been key to Eritrea’s self-definition in the post-independence 
period.  It has formed an important part of the new discourse of self-reliance. As an 
article from the Toronto Sun began: “What makes Eritrea…the most unusual [state] in 
Africa, if not the world, is that it doesn’t like foreign aid….it’s also the safest, least 
corrupt, most self-reliant.”69  Starting out without any foreign debt at all, Eritrea seemed 
to be forging a new direction in development, and was widely acclaimed for its rejection 
of conditional aid and willingness to liberalize the economy.  
The adoption of liberalization is generally interpreted as a pragmatic move.70 
Despite Eritrea’s apparent enthusiasm for privatising state-enterprises, privatisation has in 
practice often meant the creation of  “para-partatals”  -- party-owned firms.71 Nielsen sees 
this development as merely a new manifestation of a much older EPLF entrepreneurial 
activities, which included many businesses owned and run in Italy, the Sudan, and the 
Middle East, sourcing goods from as far away as Asia.72  Either way, these developments 
enable the party to dominate the ‘private’ sector in much of Eritrea’s economy.73 There 
was even a remarkably candid interview in the English-language press, in which the head 
of economic affairs at PFDJ was asked “is the PFDJ not monopolizing all economic 
activities”.  He replied that it was too early to come to such a conclusion, noting that “the 
PFDJ is doing everything in broad daylight, openly!”.74 
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Eritrea’s reputation for honesty and low levels of corruption has also been widely 
trumpeted.  Former American Congressman and law professor, Tom Campbell is 
probably the most high-profile proponent of Eritrea’s investment potential, because of its 
purported low levels of corruption. 75 Nielsen makes the contrary argument, that 
successive waves of ‘anti-corruption campaigns’ reveal the presence of high-level 
corruption during and after the struggle.76 
Eritrea’s relationship with loaners and donors, has also been distinct, with the 
government insisting that most funds are transferred to ministries, restricting the activities 
of NGOs, and resisting conditionalities .  While this has been interpreted as a sign of self-
reliance, it also reflects the governments’ desire to maintain centralised, top-down control 
over expenditures and initiatives.77 
As in other predominantly rural African states, land and agriculture are at the 
heart of most development agendas.  Unlike other struggles, land did not play a dominant 
role in the discourse of liberation, but the EPLF did address land issues in liberated 
zones, and established a land commission soon after independence. The land policy gives 
Eritreans usufruct rights in either the village of their mother or father.  But although only 
isolated and partial studies have been carried out into the implementation of the policy, it 
appears that practice has been very far from theory.  The policy will prove particularly 
problematic in urban-periphery villages, which as Emba-Derho, studied by Nielsen.  In 
this community, conflicts over land, and access to land for ex-fighters led to illegal house 
constructions, threatened demolition, and the jailing of a demobilized female fighter, 
trying to build a house for her family.78  As this suggests the land issue manifests itself in 
Asmara as an extreme housing shortage.  Although some, (including Robert Kaplan), 
believe that there are no informal housing areas in Asmara, they are simply well hidden. 
Not only are there some informal areas in Asmara, which are denied most services, but 
crowding within established urban dwellings is extra-ordinary. 79  The recent urban land 
distributions may improve access to land, but preliminary research suggests that it will 
lead to informal and impracticable arrangements between those with access to land, and 
those with the means to build on that land.   
Land issues in rural areas are also salient because the Eritrean reconstruction 
agenda involves settling new, and returning, populations in the fertile western lowlands, 
which were historically inhabited by pastoralist communities.80 The expectation is  that 
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highlanders and former refugees will settle in the lowlands and pursue agriculture. 
Abdelkader Saleh indicates that state-sponsored irrigation schemes have already led to 
encroachment on arable land in Gash-Barka.81  This sets the development agenda – with 
its emphasis on self-reliance in the production of food crops – on a potential collision 
with the rights of local communities. In guaranteeing all Eritreans access to land  for 
agriculture, the land proclamation makes no arrangement for pastoralist land use.  As 
Alex Naty notes in a thought-provoking paper, despite the significant efforts made to 
increase national integration, population shifts and other pressures have the potential to 
unleash local conflicts.82  
In addition to settling communities on former pasture-land, the Eritrean 
government also advocates the sedentarization/villagization of pastoralist communities.  
This is not necessarily an anti-pastoralist policy (although the desire to control Muslim 
populations may play a part in their thinking). Sedentarization also reflects a nationalist 
desire to provide the same resources to people everywhere, regardless of their occupation 
or ethnic group.83 The administrative boundary changes and resettlement of refugees in 
the western lowlands, have long been recognized as a potential area of conflict.  At the 
time of the administrative changes,  the minister responsible acknowledged  the potential 
for conflict between pastoralists and new settlements,  but stated that the nomads “should 
eventually settle down and develop their land”.84   
Sedentarization, which has proven to be disastrous throughout the horn, is a 
component of the broader ‘modernising’ approach to agricultural production, which is 
also visible in policies advocating large state-run and/or commercial farms.85  This 
appears to be very much the model currently being advocated in Eritrea.  Currently much 
of the manpower for such schemes is thought to be being provided by the warsai-yikealo 
initiative, which involves national service conscripts in development work. Cliffe is 
sceptical about the sustainability of “armies of tractors and national service personnel” in 
food production and the scheme has generated much political discontent among youth.86   
 
Demobilization 
Demobilization has been another important aspect of Eritrea’s transition.  The most 
interesting research on the experiences of fighters in post-liberation Eritrea revolves 
around the insights of gender-oriented research.  This entry-point into the experiences of 
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both women and fighters (and women-fighters) in Eritrea has doubtless been privileged 
as a site of research because of the prominence given to accounts of women fighters and 
gender-blind policies in the  EPLF.87  Such narratives continue to have power, and 
continue to circulate.  Note for instance Asgedet Stefanos’ recent photo-essay: “Eritrean 
women: defending national borders and challenging gender boundaries”. 88  In this essay, 
accompanying photos by Cheryl Hatch taken during the 1998-2000 war, Asgedet argues 
that “it is within this struggle to establish and maintain nationhood that a profound shift 
occurred that expanded Eritrean women’s role in politics, the economy, the family and 
education”.89  She argues that Hatch’s images provide “a model of strength, of survival, 
of beauty, and of successful agency…these portraits convey the degree to which women 
themselves are creators of their own destinies in contemporary Eritrea.”90  Indeed, the 
images do show a p ositive and multi-faceted view of women in Eritrea.  But other 
research suggests that women’s re-insertion into civilian life has been much more 
problematic.  Matsuoka and Sorenson note critically that the Eritrean Constitution does 
not specifically mention gender issues.   They also note, as do many others,  that gender-
based household divisions of labour have remained static.  And that some female ex-
combatants have  had a hard time adjusting to the ‘new’ expectations of them in civilian 
life, despite the government’s formal commitment to bring gender equality and 
emancipation to women.  91  Another anthropologist examining the experience of  ex-
fighter women, argues that while the liberation war did liberate women to compete with 
men, it continued to devalue the ‘women’s sphere’.92  Noting the problems faced by 
women ex-fighters, many of whom feel devalued in the new Eritrea, Bernal suggests that 
“the EPLF created a kind of gender equality by eliminating the domestic sphere and 
feminine identity”. 93 She notes: 
If women gained some equality by acting like and being treated as honorary 
men in the Front, this is unworkable in civilian life, where women are 
mothers and childcare and domestic work are no longer organised as public 
work.94 
 
Bernal queries the way in which women as fighters have become “mythico-historical” 
figures in nationalist history, but are “rendered irrelevant to the new nationalist project of 
development”.95  Interestingly, Christine Mason’s work might be seen to contribute to 
this, by reclaiming  the importance of women supporting the struggle through more 
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‘traditional’ roles in the ELF.96  She argues that the standard EPLF account of women in 
the struggle “essentializes women’s role in the nationalist project and prioritises certain 
activities over others”.97  Through this research, she not only challenges assumptions 
about the role of women in the ELF, but about the ELF itself.  Not only do the women 
she interviews feel “excluded from Eritrean history, myth and political rhetoric”98 but the 
ELF has i tself been written out of history in the interests of  “exclud[ing] dissenting 
voices in order to preserve an artificial unity”.99 
 
International relations: nationhood re-defended 
Kaplan’s depiction of a sleepy peaceful Eritrea, certainly did not capture the internal 
tensions of recent months – disappearances, and arrests of many EPLF leaders and 
ordinary citizens, explosions in Asmara city-centre, and the ever-present fear of renewed 
conflict with Sudan or Ethiopia.    
Since 1991, Eritrea has engaged in two formal armed conflicts:  in 1996 with 
Yemen; 1998-2000 with Ethiopia.  Tension with Sudan emerged in the mid-1990s when 
it was alleged that Sudan supported the Eritrean Islamic Jihad.  In the months before the 
conflict with Ethiopia, a reader of government statements and newspapers would have 
been forgiven for expecting conflict with Sudan, not Ethiopia, such was the level of 
verbal confrontation.  And again in mid- 2002, as the Sudanese government alleged that 
the Eritrean army was fighting in the eastern Sudan, alongside the NDA, tension again 
flared.  As Lionel Cliffe has argued, the pattern of “mutual intervention” in which 
“opponents of existing regimes all receive some support from…other countries in the 
region” makes the resolution of conflict in the Horn particularly difficult.100  
This pattern of conflict has also been linked to the earlier struggle, in particular, the 
“character of the movements and the states they created”.101 As Cliffe argues, the 
experiences of the TPLF and EPLF did not engender political learning about 
compromise: 
Both had a history of engaging in a principled battle for rights that they 
proclaimed and moreover won a complete victory ion doing so.  They are 
thus unused to the arts of compromise, to searching for a solution acceptable 
to both sides; they have little experience and few skills in diplomacy.102    
 
He suggests that the root cause of the war is governmental weaknesses:  “the decision-
making mechanisms of both governments and a certain democratic deficiency, together 
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with the absence of adequate institutional arrangements for dialogue and conflict 
resolution…precipitated a massive escalation of a minor containable conflict”103 Ruth 
Iyob, who has presented one of the most convincing explanations for Eritrea’s apparently 
belligerent stance, theorizes it further.  She similarly argues that the relationship between 
Eritrea and Ethiopia was under-institutionalized, and as such, prone to misunderstandings 
and conflicts.  But she also describes Eritrea as a proto-typical ‘diaspora state’, which in 
extending citizenship outside its borders to its diaspora, came to threaten the state-
building project of its former ally, Ethiopia.104   
  As this suggests, these recent conflicts may have an important role to play in 
nation-building.  Cliffe, for instance, wonders whether Africa, repeating a pattern where 
by “the struggle to shape and define national identities is in part played out through both 
internal wars, but also wars between states that in turn redefine those states”. 105  This is 
exactly the point investigated by Chris Clapham in a recent paper on war and state-
making,  in Nielsen’s thesis and in a paper by Tronvoll.106  Nielsen argues that in Eritrea, 
“war can be seen as an instrument of economic and political regeneration that leads to the 
creation of a new postcolonial hegemony”.107 Clapham, referring more to the 1998-2000 
conflict ,  is dubious about the long-term sustainability of national identities founded 
through  war, but does note that “war helps to promote a sense of solidarity from which 
the incumbent governments benefit”.108 Tronvoll however argues that in Eritrea: 
 
conflicts [are considered] necessary for the demarcation of 
…religious..ethnic..political..and territorial borders and boundaries , in order 
both to defend what they perceive as competing claims to parts of `eritrean 
territory and to re-establish ‘significant others’ that the ‘formal’ eritrean 
identity may be contrasted against.109  
 
  One important forum for debating the war  and constructing  identities among 
transnational communities in both Eritrea and Ethiopia, was the internet.  Allessandro 
Triulzi notes how: 
The respective diaspora joined in and loudly took part in the globalized realm 
of internet. New suppressed memories were made to surface and came to be 
articulated during this period in a fierce new battle of definitions and slogans 
concerning the ‘we’ and ‘them’, the ‘nation’ and its ‘enemy’.110 
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But the war, and political repercussions since 2000, may also have damaged relations 
between the Eritrean state and the diaspora.  Khalid Koser notes that while the diaspora 
“reunited itself to defend its country” during the war, there was also “a growing sense of 
disillusionment with the Eritrean state”.  111 Based on interviews within the Eritrean 
diaspora, he proposes that the war has also contributed to the “long term alienation of an 
important part of the external support base for the authoritarian regime”. 112  Eritreans in 
the diaspora increasingly feel as though their liberation-based symbiotic relationship with 





The research presented above is in direct contrast with Kaplan’s stable and disciplined 
Eritrea.  Yet, these arguments accord neatly with other current research into state-
building, democratisation and conflict in Africa. In a draft paper examining conflict in 
Zanzibar and Zimbabwe since the 2000 elections Dorman and Cameron emphasize that 
these violent conflicts emanated from the perceived failure of the nationalist regime to 
‘bring the benefits of independence’ equally to all regions and groups.  Conflict in these 
two cases, we propose, should be interpreted as reflecting the unraveling of the post-
independence coalition of forces, formerly held in check by authoritarian politics and 
state expenditure. 114    
Such accounts, which emphasize the coalitional nature of liberation struggle, and 
their heterogeneous nature, were made about nationalism in West Africa in the 1950s and 
1960s115, and have re-emerged through the detailed historiography of the Zimbabwean 
liberation struggle.116  But in Eritrea, which like those other struggles, emphasized the 
unity of the Eritrean people (whose very existence was questioned) such accounts 
threaten the very basis of the regime’s legitimacy, but may also be interpreted as 
threatening the nation’s legitimacy.  In a way not experienced in Zimbabwe or Ghana, 
whose right to existence was never questioned (but merely the right to majority rule), 
Eritrea’s myths of unity and self-reliance were not just constructed to strengthen the 
liberation movement, but to advance the very existence of the putative nation. The history 
of Eritrea’s struggle is so inter-twined with a narrative of the EPLF’s own history and 
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ethos, that distinguishing the two is nearly unthinkable.   While those of us outside may 
see Eritrea as ‘here to stay’, those who battled to build the nation and the state, may find 
such narratives to be more challenging.   In the light of Eritrea’s on-going conflicts with 
neighbours, and scarce resources, contested narratives of liberation are construed as 
threatening Eritrea’s existence. The necessity of upholding one orthodox account 
becomes paramount. But multi-vocal narratives dominate the internet, as on-line groups 
commemorate ELF martyrs, document the incarceration of EPLF die-hards, and 
challenge the PFDJ’s dominance of discourse.  Unable to control discourse, the strategy 
is to deny them the moral right to speak: to label those outside the orthodox account as 
‘treasonous’ and ‘pro-Ethiopian’, which can only retard and damage the state and nation-
building project underway in Eritrea.   
 
As the Eritreans say, “Awet n’hafash!”— Victory to the masses! 
 
 
  